A thorough understanding of the epidemiology of transmission of a pathogen from its wild reservoir host to humans is essential to design effective surveillance and control schemes for zoonotic diseases. Intensive surveys have followed previous outbreaks of Ebola (EBO) hemorrhagic fever (EHF), but the number of outbreaks has been small and the reservoir for EBO virus remains unknown [1] [2] [3] [4] . Although all previous searches have yielded negative results, composite data generated in the laboratory (e.g., cell culture susceptibility, limited experimental infection of animals) and theoretical considerations suggest that small mammals are the most likely reservoirs [5] [6] [7] .
After previous EHF outbreaks, an extended delay hampered searches for the virus reservoir, often with 1 year passing between the outbreak and the organization and start of ecologic surveys. In most cases, the primary case (i.e., the person who became infected from the wild reservoir and began the humanto-human transmission chain) could not be identified with sufficient certainty or had traveled large distances before the onset of illness. Often this person was deceased, and information about his or her activities was fragmentary. This limited the effective focus of the surveys [1] [2] [3] [4] . During the 1995 outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), an international team tentatively identified a local resident as the primary case. This individual had not traveled before becoming ill, and a likely transmission locality could be established. Although the primary case had become infected in December 1994 and the ecologic study team arrived in June 1995, it was reasonably likely that an intensive study might identify the reservoir.
From 10 June to 28 August 1995, we conducted an extensive survey under World Health Organization (Geneva) auspices and the sponsorship of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, Atlanta). Here we report on the collection of vertebrates gathered during this survey and present the results of the virologic studies of these materials. We discuss the problems that are inherent to the search for the reservoir of a rare zoonosis and make some suggestions for future research. The report on the collection of invertebrates is presented separately [8] .
Materials and Methods
Selection of collection sites. The putative primary case was a farmer who lived in Kikwit but worked several maize and cassava fields in the forest at Mbwambala, about 8 km southeast of Kikwit [8, 9] . He had recently (December 1994) also excavated a charcoal pit near his fields. He had not traveled beyond the environs of Kikwit during the months before becoming ill, but he did visit his fields and charcoal pit daily. Since he was the only probable EHF case identified with no definitive link to a prior human case, it seemed unlikely that he had become infected in or around his home in the densely populated town of Kikwit. Therefore, the search for the EBO virus reservoir focused primarily on the forest biotopes near his fields, which could be exactly located (figure 1), and limited small-mammal trapping and livestock sampling were also conducted near his home.
Because of the remaining uncertainty about the identification of the primary case and the lack of information on this person's activities or behavior that could have influenced his contact with a variety of vertebrates from areas surrounding Kikwit, additional collection sites were selected in order to maximize the number of sampled habitats (figure 1). In addition, small game animals (e.g., large rodents, small carnivores, antelopes, pangolins, monkeys) were purchased from hunters or at "bush meat" markets. The exact origin of these specimens could not be established with certainty; often they came from considerable distances (>50 km) since most game has disappeared from the Kikwit area due to hunting. To investigate the possibility of virus transmission from EHF patients to commensal rodents, we also placed traps in and around the pavilion that housed EHF patients at the Kikwit General Hospital and the hospital morgue, where deceased EHF patients were held until burial. When we made these collections, there were still acute EHF cases in the pavilion, but the last patient death at the hospital occurred the day small-mammal trapping began there (24 June 1995). At the peak of the EHF epidemic, when basic hygiene was low, small mammals had access to patient excrement, medical wastes, and cadavers on the pavilion floor, in the semi-attached privies, and in the area surrounding the pavilion where excrement and medical wastes were discarded.
Description ofprincipalfield sites. Below, we list the six principal trapping sites together with a general description of the habi- Another vegetation type in Mbwambala was the large patches of highly disturbed fallow land (probably abandoned maize and cassava fields) covered by thick, low brush, which usually was a monoculture of 1-to 2-m-high Chromolaena (Eupatorium) odoratum. These areas were dense and nearly impenetrable but hot and relatively dry at the soil surface because of the lack of an herbaceous layer.
The third type of vegetation in Mbwambala was cultivated patches of cassava, maize, or, rarely, bananas. These patches were generally cleared of other vegetation and were hot and dry at the soil surface.
The last type of vegetation in Mbwambala was linear patches of dense mesic vegetation along watercourses. These habitats were dominated by dense herbaceous vegetation covering soil that was moist to wet. Plant species diversity was high; typical species included Aframomum species, Costus species, and Ataenidia conferta.
The Mist nets were placed at locations where bats or birds had been observed or were deemed likely to occur and were set at ground level or elevated 2-2.7 m, depending on the site characteristics.
Most nets were operated 24 h per day and checked regularly; however, near buildings they were used only shortly before dusk. A handmade Tuttle bat trap was operated at mission sites and collected molossid bats only.
All traps were checked daily in the early morning. Live-capture traps that contained animals were placed in double plastic bags and tied closed before being transported to an isolated, outdoor central processing area. Animals were sampled following standardized procedures [10, 11] . Before opening plastic bags containing animals, dissectors donned disposable surgeons' gowns, double latex gloves, and powered air-purifying respirators fitted with HEPA filters. After animals were anesthetized with methoxyflurane, weight, sex, and body measurements were recorded, and blood samples were obtained from the retroorbital sinus with capillary tubes or by cardiac puncture in small mammals and from the brachial or jugular vein in birds.
Animals were euthanatized by cervical dislocation, overdose of anesthetic, or inhalation of CO2 and preliminarily identified to genus or species level before tissues (spleen, kidneys, liver, lungs) were removed by use of sterile scissors and forceps. Large mammals, which were usually dead when purchased, were sampled by obtaining blood from the heart and, when possible, a small amount of tissue from other organs. Unusual necropsy findings were recorded and, when appropriate, photographs were taken. All samples were placed in labeled cryovials and stored in liquid nitrogen until shipped on dry ice to CDC. In total, 3066 blood samples were collected, including samples from dogs, cattle, and pet primates.
Carcasses were labeled, fixed in formalin, and sent to the University of Antwerp, Belgium, where they were rinsed for 4 days and stored in alcohol until further identification and taxonomic study. Animals were identified at the Museum Alexander Koenig, Bonn, Germany (shrews); the Royal Museum for Central Africa, Tervuren, Belgium (birds and lizards); and the University of Antwerp (bats, snakes, rodents, other groups). Among the 2544 preserved carcasses, confirmed identification was obtained at least at the genus level for 2493 specimens; for the others, inadequate material or lost or damaged labels prevented unambiguous identification, and herein we will use the preliminary field identification for these specimens. The collected carcasses will be kept as voucher specimens in the Royal Museum for Central Africa and the Museum of Southwestern Biology, Albuquerque; a small reference collection of rodents will be deposited at the University of Kisangani, DRC. Tissues will be deposited at the Museum of Southwestern Biology.
Serology and virus isolation. After arriving at CDC (Atlanta) the blood samples were organized by species for those species for which commercial conjugates were available (rodents, insectivores, chiropterans, and ungulates, as determined by testing conjugate reactivity with blood adsorbed onto polyvinyl chloride [ Virus isolation was attempted in a biosafety level 4 laboratory from the spleen (or liver if spleen was unavailable) of those animals from which the organ had been collected. The spleen was triturated in a volume of Hanks' balanced salt solution with 5% heat-inactivated fetal bovine serum to yield a 10% wt/vol suspension. After trituration, the suspension was divided into three aliquots: One was added to a small microtube for EBO virus antigen detection, another was frozen at below -700C, and another was used for tissue culture isolation attempts.
A portion of the suspension, 0.2 mL, was inoculated, without refreezing, onto confluent monolayers of Vero E6 cells in a T25 flask and adsorbed with constant rocking for 1 h at 37TC. Eagle MEM with Earle's balanced salt solution with 2% heat-inactivated fetal bovine serum containing 20 mg gentamycin and 50 U nystatin/mL was added to the flask, and about every other day for 14 days, the cell monolayers were observed by use of a microscope. Maintenance medium was changed at day 7, and if no cytopathic effect was observed earlier, cells were removed from the flask with 3-mm glass beads, and a portion of the cells was centrifuged and resuspended in borate saline and applied to 4 wells of triplicate teflon-coated microscope slides.
Another portion of the culture was frozen and held at -700C. Slides were air-dried and then irradiated with 20,000 Gy of gamma while refrigerated on dry ice. The slides were then fixed in acetone at room temperature and stained with a polyvalent anti-EBO hyperimmune rabbit serum made by immunizing rabbits with EBO (subtypes Zaire, Sudan, and Reston) viruses, followed by goat antirabbit conjugated to fluorescein isothiocyanate. Appropriate EBO virus control slides were used with each batch of slides, stained to ensure that the antiserum and fluorescein isothiocyanate conjugate were working.
Antigen-detection ELISAs were performed on all tissue homogenates after irradiation of the material with 20,000 Gy. The tissue homogenates were tested at dilutions of 1:4, 1:16, 1:64, and 1:256 as previously described, with slight modifications, for detection of antigen in infected primates [12] . Positive controls for the 4 known EBO virus subtypes (Zaire, Sudan, Reston, and C6te d'Ivoire) were run with each assay.
Results
Vertebrate collection. Most of the 3066 collected specimens were mammals (87%, 2663), followed by birds (9%, 265) and reptiles and amphibia (4%, 129) and 9 specimens from other taxa (figure 2). Among the mammals, most of the collection consisted of rodents (72%, 1914), bats (20%, 539), and insectivores (4%, 115). Small numbers of specimens from the orders Carnivora, Primates, Artiodactyla, Pholidota, and Macroscelida were also obtained. Overall, 78 mammal species, 51 bird species, and 22 species of reptiles and amphibians could be differentiated. Among mammals, diversity was highest in Rodentia (29 species), followed by Chiroptera (18 species) and Insectivora (10 species: table 1). The distribution of the number of specimens collected from each mammal species was skewed (figure 3). Few specimens were obtained from the majority of the species, with <10 specimens available from 48 mammalian species and 22 species represented by a single specimen. There were 6 species, accounting for 66% of all collected mammals, for which > 100 specimens were collected.
Serology and virus isolations. ELISA testing for EBO virus antibody has been completed on 2393 of the 2906 blood specimens available for testing (table 1) . No antibody against the Zaire subtype of EBO was detected among specimens that could be tested.
Virus isolation has been completed on 2730 collected animals for which a spleen was available. For an additional 84 specimens, no spleen was available, so isolation attempts were made upon the liver. All attempts at isolation of EBO virus have been negative. However, a number of viruses preliminarily identified as arenaviruses were isolated and will be the topic of a future report. None of the 2814 tissue suspensions were positive for EBO virus antigen by ELISA.
Discussion
Despite extensive efforts in the field after this and other EHF outbreaks, the EBO virus reservoir remains unknown [4] . A number of potential reasons that are inherent to these kinds of studies may explain why field investigations have yielded disappointing results. For future work, it is important to explicitly acknowledge the existence of these problems.
Although our ecologic field team arrived soon after the outbreak was reported and confirmed, 6 months had already passed since the putative primary case became infected. Ecologic sampling was done during the dry season, whereas the potential primary transmission event happened during the wet season. Seasonal variation in the composition of small mammal species is small but does exist in tropical rain forests, and some species may display considerable fluctuations [13] [14] [15] [16] . Such temporal variation would have resulted in the sampling of a faunal assemblage that differed in composition, abundance, and diversity from that present at the time of the infection of the primary case. The infection status of the reservoir species could also be significantly influenced by seasonal variation (e.g., if arthropod vectors are involved in the enzootic maintenance of EBO infection). Moreover, it is possible that animals infected at the time of the primary case's infection did not survive long enough to be represented in our sample. Similar doubts exist concerning the site selected for the field work. Although the identification of a relatively well-documented primary case enabled the implication of a likely infection site in which to focus our surveys, there inevitably remained some doubts that made the concentration of all efforts at a single site too risky.
These uncertainties were further aggravated by the logistical problems that will likely encumber any investigation in isolated areas, particularly in developing countries: transport and power supply problems, the cold-chain maintenance of biologic materials, lack of up-to-date maps of the area to help select sample collection sites, recruitment of specialist staff members, and biosafety concerns).
More fundamentally, there are several other problems that are inherent to the search for the reservoir of a pathogen such as EBO virus, and these problems require that we make certain assumptions. Our investigation was largely based on three key assumptions derived from our current understanding of the properties of the virus and epidemiology of the disease. The virus has several characteristics that suggest that mammals are the most likely host [5, 6, 17] . Therefore, assumption one was that the reservoir is a mammal. Second, documented EHF outbreaks in Africa have always been linked to rain forests, both for human outbreaks and for epizootics and occasional infections in chimpanzees [1, 2, 18-20]; therefore, assumption two was that the reservoir is at least a part-time forest species. Last, the number of reported EHF outbreaks is very low, suggesting that the probability for humans becoming infected from the wild reservoir is very low. Thus, assumption three was that such a pattern of disease could be explained if the reservoir is very rare, if the reservoir is not rare but occurs in habitats or has behavioral patterns that support only rare contact with humans, or if the virus in the reservoir population is inefficiently transmitted to other species yet effectively maintains itself in the reservoir species (e.g., sexual transmission), or a combination of these factors. Cattle  -2 -----------2  0  2  Goat  -1 -----------1  0  0  Pig  ---2  2  0  2  Sheep  -------------5  5 Miniopterus minor ---------2  2  2  2   Mops condylurus  10 --------10  10  10   Mops nanulus   -13  1  --------14  14  14   Mops niveiventer  ---------3  3  3  3 Mops thersites
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The very skewed distribution of specimens among species is typical of natural habitats [21] and, tautologically, rare species are rarely caught. Moreover, unless the prevalence of infection is high, the small sample size from rare species makes it unlikely that infected animals would be trapped. This statistical problem necessitated the collection of large numbers of speci- mens from the common species whenever possible. In addition, there was a chance to detect a collateral infection even if these species were not the true reservoir. Inevitably, the amount of work involved in processing the large number of collected animals in the field decreased the effort we could invest in capturing rare species. Furthermore, it was considered unacceptable not to sample all specimens that were collected (even if they belonged to common groups) because of current taxonomic difficulties regarding mammals, particularly in relatively isolated or unstudied areas, such as those where EHF outbreaks have occurred [22] . For many small mammal species, identification in the field is not possible. Often, it is not known which species of a certain genus occur in the area. Superficial identification or keeping a limited number of reference specimens may not be enough, since some species can only be distinguished by cranial morphology or even genetic techniques (e.g., karyotyping or DNA-sequencing). Finally, the alpha-taxonomy may not be complete, meaning that the specimens may belong to an unrecognized species. This latter problem is not uncommon for small mammals; for example, in the Kikwit collection, there were at least 5 species of the shrew genus Crocidura, while 4 other groups cannot yet be named and may eventually turn out to be separate species (table 1). Although the exact given name of a species may seem irrelevant in the present context, the recognition of specific taxa is important from an epidemiologic point of view. For example, within the genus Mastomys there are two cryptic species that can occur together and can be recognized only by the number of chromosomes; one of them, M. natalensis, is resistant to plague while the other one, M. coucha, is very susceptible to it [23] . There are many instances in medical entomology in which poor taxonomy has led to ineffective or even disastrous pest management strategies [24] [25] .
Moreover, several technical issues are of primary concern in studies to find the reservoir of a virus. It is not known whether EBO virus persistently infects the true reservoir species, such as occurs for hantaviruses [26] and arenaviruses [27] in their rodent hosts. If such persistence does occur, virus isolation would offer a reasonable opportunity for success and would allow identification of the reservoir. On the other hand, if the period of virus infection is relatively brief, the probability of recovering an EBO virus isolate would be much lower, and detection of antibody as evidence of past infection might be the best primary means of detection. It is also possible that the virus exists in some cryptic form that makes it difficult to isolate from tissues of the reservoir species, although this seems unlikely since EBO viruses are readily isolated from infected patients.
The quandary for those seeking the reservoir of EBO viruses is that insufficient information is available to choose a method that would limit the search to a smaller subset of animal species or to select a single technology for identifying the reservoir species. Other technical issues that complicate the laboratory testing for the evidence of the virus are the difficulties in testing for antibodies in a wide variety of taxa. Efforts are underway to remedy this.
Multiple outbreaks of EHF in humans and primates have occurred recently in Gabon, and genetic analyses of the viruses recovered confirmed that each outbreak was due to an independent introduction of the virus from a putative reservoir [19] . This relatively high level of virus activity suggests that Gabon is a promising site for future ecologic investigations.
Conclusions
Despite considerable effort in the field and in the laboratory, no evidence was found of EBO virus infection in the fauna collected during and immediately after the 1995 EHF epidemic in Kikwit. Uncertainties about where and how the first human case might have contracted the EBO infection and the time that elapsed since the beginning of the epidemic led to difficulty in drawing solid conclusions from these negative data. Furthermore, even if these limitations were not at issue, sample size considerations would limit our ability to form exclusionary conclusions on all but a few commonly collected species of animals. If one uses 100 animals as a sample that allows such conclusions, very few species can be excluded for future considerations: 6 total species (bats: 1 genus, 2 species; rodents: 3 genera, 4 species).
Even so, the approach we used would be the most appropriate one were another outbreak of EHF to occur. The probability of detecting the virus from the reservoir is small, but the collection allows the description of the local fauna and suggests possible targets for laboratory-based experimental investigation. Ultimately, accumulating epidemiologic information combined with timely field and appropriate laboratory investigation will result in the answer to the EBO reservoir question.
